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Abstract
Background Several theories propose alternative explanations
for drug addiction.
Objectives We propose a general theory of transition to ad-
diction that synthesizes knowledge generated in the field of
addiction into a unitary explanatory frame.
Major principles of the theory Transition to addiction results
from a sequential three-step interaction between: (1) individ-
ual vulnerability; (2) degree/amount of drug exposure. The
first step, sporadic recreational drug use is a learning process
mediated by overactivation of neurobiological substrates of
natural rewards that allows most individuals to perceive drugs
as highly rewarding stimuli. The second, intensified,
sustained, escalated drug use occurs in some vulnerable indi-
viduals who have a hyperactive dopaminergic system and
impaired prefrontal cortex function. Sustained and prolonged
drug use induces incentive sensitization and an allostatic state
that makes drugs strongly wanted and needed. Habit forma-
tion can also contribute to stabilizing sustained drug use. The
last step, loss of control of drug intake and full addiction, is
due to a second vulnerable phenotype. This loss-of-control-
prone phenotype is triggered by long-term drug exposure and
characterized by long-lasting loss of synaptic plasticity in
reward areas in the brain that induce a form of behavioral
crystallization resulting in loss of control of drug intake.
Because of behavioral crystallization, drugs are now not only
wanted and needed but also pathologically mourned when
absent.
Conclusions This general theory demonstrates that drug ad-
diction is a true psychiatric disease caused by a three-step
interaction between vulnerable individuals and amount/
duration of drug exposure.
Keywords Drug addiction . Drug abuse . Drug use . Drug
dependence . Drugs of abuse . Loss of control . Individual
differences . Addiction theory
Introduction
This paper is not an extensive review of the literature on
addiction but a position paper largely based on our own work
and more generally on contributions of the Bordeaux School
of Psychobiology. Here we provide the foundation for what
we believe is the first “general” theory of transition to addic-
tion. We qualify this as a general theory because it allows the
organization and fitting together of most data produced by
researchers in the field of addiction. However, our theory is
limited to this transition and does not attempt to address the
mechanisms of drug relapse (for recent reviews on this topic,
see Kalivas 2009; Pickens et al. 2011; Bossert et al. 2013).
We describe the fundamentals of this general theory of
transition to addiction in three sections. In the first section,
we discuss the frame of reference we use to define addiction,
which allows us to identify three separate steps in this process:
(1) recreational, sporadic (ReS) drug use; (2) intensified,
sustained, escalated (ISuE) drug use; (3) loss of control
(LoC) of drug intake and full addiction. In the second section,
we critically assess the roles of drug exposure and individual
vulnerabilities in the process of transition to addiction, identi-
fying the respective and essential roles of these two variables.
In the third section, we describe the potential biological and
psychological bases of the three phases of transition to
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addiction (see Fig. 1 for a summary of the theory). Finally, in
the “Conclusion,”we describe crucial assumptions that can be
used to further prove or falsify our theory.
One of the major contributions of our theory is to further
support the idea that addiction is a true psychiatric pathology
and not an iatrogenic disease resulting from a vice. This vision
of addiction is a much-needed evolution of howmost societies
view and treat addiction. In agreement with what has previ-
ously been proposed by Leshner (1997), addiction should not
be considered a condition for which the individual is largely
responsible and for which he or she should be punished but as
a disease that needs treatment.
Section 1: How to define transition to addiction?
Leave preconceptions of the disease aside and focus
on the patient
In addressing the issue of defining addiction, the most com-
plicated point is to avoid a circular definition or a partial view
of the disease based on personal, cultural, scientific, or theo-
retical backgrounds. One way of avoiding this is to clarify
goals and define priorities. In this context, the goal and the
priority of research on addiction and other diseases is to find a
treatment. The definition of the disease should then reflect the
reality of the final recipient of the research effort, the addict.
For this purpose, the definition of addiction should be opera-
tional and based on the behavior of those whom our society
identifies as drug addicts. We should not say that addiction is
this and that; instead, we should start saying that an addict is
this and that. As the identification of human addicts is based
on specific criteria in diagnostic manuals [principally the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD), but also see the recent evolution of the Research
Domain Criteria Initiative (RDoC)], the behavioral definition
of addiction should be based on these diagnostic criteria. The
neurobiological basis and potential treatments for addiction
should then be tested and evaluated in animal models that are
based on criteria used in these manuals. We believe that a
definition of addiction that encompasses the addict’s behavior
allows the highest chances for us to help find a treatment for
that disease.
Transition to addiction in humans
The first observation that arises from reading addiction-related
diagnostic manuals is that taking drugs in itself is not a
pathological behavior; rather, taking drugs in certain ways
and with certain consequences is what defines a drug-related
problem and addiction.
Recreational nonpathological drug use
The intake of natural or synthetic substances for their psycho-
active properties is a behavior widely represented in humans.
Among the most common substances used in Western socie-
ties, one could cite coffee, tea, alcoholic beverages, and to-
bacco, followed by the most widely used illegal drug, canna-
bis. At least two of these substances, alcoholic beverages and
tobacco, are capable of generating a very severe form of
addiction that is highly resistant to treatment. Why, then, are
alcohol and tobacco cigarettes legal substances? Clearly there
are huge economic interests that make it impractical to declare
alcohol and cigarettes illegal. However, probably the true
reasons that allow this economic drive to win over the risk
to develop addiction are twofold:
1. Experiencing a “high” is one of the major goal-directed
activities of the human species. Themajor consequence of
a large number of recreational activities is to strongly alter
brain activity. In fact, an enormous effort on the part of
human societies is dedicated to enabling these activities.
The list is very long, and we cite only a few for which
entire industries have been developed and dedicated fa-
cilities are built in most cities and towns. This is the case
for many sports, either directly practiced or watched. It is
the case for music-related activities of playing, listening,
and dancing. It is also the case for many forms of visual
entertainment that screen features that aim to induce in the
audience intense emotions. Last but not least are the
gourmet food and sex industries, in which the goal is
clearly not one to feed or reproduce but to give intense
pleasure. Taking drugs can be reasonably seen as another
form of recreational activity in which brain activity is not
modified through the sensory system but directly through
specific pharmacological compounds. Why humans
spend so much time and money and have such a strong
motivation to experience a high is certainly a very impor-
tant question. However, it is not the subject of this paper,
and we accept it merely as a fact. The interested reader
could refer to the book by Ronald K. Siegel, Intoxication,
which discusses this issue at length and posits that intox-
ication is an innate drive seen across species (Siegel
2005).
2. Addiction is something believed to be happening to
others. For most drugs of abuse, approximately only
15 % of users will progress from recreational use to a
substance-related disorder (Anthony et al. 1994; Nutt
et al. 2007), with the highest being nicotine (30 %) and
the lowest cannabis (10 %) (Lopez-Quintero et al. 2011).
The fact that drugs seem to be the pleasure of many and
the doom of just a few “others” contributes strongly to the
difficulty in controlling and forbidding drug use at the
societal level. However, drugs are used by many millions
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Fig. 1 Summary of the phases and processes of transition to addiction.
Transition to addiction is a progression of three consecutive phases: (1)
Recreational, sporadic (ReS) drug use, in which drug intake is moderate
and sporadic and still one among many recreational activities of the
individual. (2) Intensified, sustained, escalated (ISuE) drug use, in which
drug intake intensifies and is now sustained and frequent and becomes the
principal recreational activity of the individual; although some decreased
societal and personal functioning start appearing, behavior is still largely
organized. (3) Loss of control (LoC) of drug use and full addiction that
results in disorganization of the addict’s behavior; drug-devoted activities
are now the principal occupations of the individual. The three phases are
consecutive but independent: entering one phase is necessary but not
sufficient to progress toward the next phase, because specific individual
vulnerabilities are needed. The first phase (ReS) occurs in most individ-
uals (use prone); drugs overactivate the same substrates of natural rewards
and therefore are perceived as extremely salient and likable stimuli. The
second phase (ISuE) occurs in a vulnerable subset of individuals (escala-
tion prone) because of quantitative differences in the activity of the brain
reward-related system, which increases the motivational effects of the
drug, for example, a hyperactive (sensitized) dopaminergic system and an
impaired prefrontal cortex. The ISuE phase is then stabilized by addition-
al drug-induced adaptations, inducing an allostatic state that makes drugs
not only strongly wanted but also needed in order for the individual to
function normally and, in certain cases, by habit formation. The last phase
(LoC) leads to full addiction and is due to a second vulnerable phenotype
that we term loss of control prone. This phenotype is characterized by a
persistent loss of long-term depression of synaptic transmission (LTD) in
reward-related brain areas, which can induce a crystallization of behavior
around drug-taking, resulting in losing control of drug intake. In the
addicted state, the presence of the drug is not only needed to function
normally, as at the end of the ISuE phase, but its absence is experienced as
an irreplaceable loss and strongly pathologically mourned. When the
individual goes from liking drugs to pathologically mourning them when
they are not available, the process of transition to addiction is complete
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of people, and consequently, millions of individuals de-
velop addiction, making it the disease, among behavioral
pathologies with the highest prevalence and, because of
the nefarious health consequence of chronic drugs use,
one of the most costly health problems of the so-called
developed countries (EMCDDA 2011).
Pathological drug intake
Defining symptoms to provide distinction between
nonpathological and pathological drug users is a matter of
debate. Indeed, drug addiction is the behavioral pathology for
which the clinical conception has evolved the most during the
last 20 years. The first considerable evolution was between the
early 1980s and the mid-1990s, as testified by the profound
revisions of the reference DSM. This manual provides a series
of behavioral symptoms (called items) that if present in an
individual in preestablished numbers and preestablished fre-
quency, allows making the diagnosis of specific pathological
behaviors. In the DSM of the early 1980s (APA 1980) (DSM-
III), two drug-related effects had to be present to make a
diagnosis of drug dependence and addiction (1) Tolerance to
drug effects: the effects of the drug decrease over time or one
needs increasingly more drug to get the same effect. (2)
Appearance of withdrawal symptoms when drug use is
discontinued. In the DSM of the late 1980s [DSM-III revised
(DSM-III-R)] (APA 1987), the category of dependence was
expanded to include some criteria that in the DSM-III were
considered symptoms of abuse. For example, the DSM-III-R
described dependence as including both physiological symp-
toms, such as tolerance and withdrawal, and behavioral symp-
toms, such as impaired control over drug use. In the DSM-IV
(APA 1994) and DSM-IV-R (APA 2000) of the 1990s and
2000s, tolerance and withdrawal remain among the diagnostic
items but are no longer necessary criteria to diagnose drug
dependence. In contrast, behavioral criteria related to loss of
control over drug-taking and seeking are expanded, and at
least one of these behavioral symptoms must be present. The
DSM-IV describes five possible behavioral alterations char-
acterizing loss of control (Table 1) and that can be grouped
into three main categories: (1) difficulty limiting drug use and
seeking (items 3 and 4); (2) extremely strong motivation to
procure the drug (items 5 and 6); (3) maintaining drug use
despite awareness of negative consequences (items 7).
In conclusion, whereas in the DSM-III transition to addic-
tion was defined as the appearance of changes in drug effects
(tolerance and withdrawal), in the DSM-IV, it is characterized
by changes in the modality of drug-taking: from controlled
drug use to loss of control (Table 1).
All these diagnostic manuals once indicated drug abuse as
a second category of pathological drug use. In the most recent
version of the DSM-IV-R (2000), drug abuse is basically
defined by the shift from sporadic drug intake to habitual
and sustained drug-taking and is measured mainly by the
appearance of drug-related behavioral problems and high
motivation for the drug, such as: (1) recurrent substance use
resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations; (2)
recurrent substance use in situations in which it is physically
hazardous; (3) recurrent substance-related legal problems; (4)
continued substance use despite persistent or recurrent social
or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the effects
of the substance.
It is important to emphasize that in the DSM-IV, drug abuse
and drug dependence are not defined as two stages—mild and
severe—of the same disease but two independent diseases
carried by orthogonal dimensions. In other words, in the
DSM-IV, abuse and dependence are two conceptually inde-
pendent categories representing a different realm of problem-
atic use. The consolidation of these two categories is probably
the major evolution from the DSM-IV (APA 1994) to the
DSM-5 (APA 2013). The DSM-5 replaces the two separate
DSM-IV (substance-specific) categories of dependence and
abuse with a single (substance-specific) category: Substance
Use Disorders (SUDs). Criteria for SUDs results from merg-
ing the previous lists of dependence and abuse criteria into a
single list of 11 criteria (Table 1). In the process, the criterion
of recurrent legal problems of drug abuse was dropped and a
criterion for craving was added. The DSM-5 also introduces
the concept of different severities of SUD that is now graded
by the number of criteria met: 0–1, unaffected; 2–3, mild; 4–5,
moderate; ≥6, severe. Another important addition is that tol-
erance and withdrawal do not count if an individual is taking a
medicine such as an opioid analgesic under medical supervi-
sion. This change will avoid the mislabelling of patients as
dependent or addicted when they develop normal physiolog-
ical dependence while adhering to a prescribed regimen
(Compton et al. 2013).
As shown in Table 1, when one analyzes the DSM-5 on the
basis of necessary and sufficient conditions to make a diag-
nosis of mild, moderate, or severe SUD, one can see that the
previous criteria of abuse plus tolerance and/or withdrawal are
sufficient to make a diagnosis of mild or moderate SUD. As
was previously the case for the dependence category in the
DSM-IV, at least one criterion of loss of control needs to be
present for a diagnosis of severe SUD. In other words, our
comparison predicts a substantial overlap between the abuse
category of the DSM-IV and the mild and moderate SUD of
the DSM-5. This prediction is confirmed by data contained in
Table 2 that were recalculated from Table 3 in the report by
Peer et al. (2013). It can be seen that, across several drugs,
diagnosis of drug abuse in the DSM-IV corresponds in 99 %
of cases to a diagnosis of mild or moderate SUD (inferior to
severe) with the DSM-5. Similarly, but as could have been
expected with less accuracy, a diagnosis of drug dependence
with the DSM-IV corresponds in at least 85 % of cases to a
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diagnosis of severe SUD with the DSM-5—except for canna-
bis, where it is 67 %. The higher prevalence of SUD of
moderate and mild intensity in the case of cannabis could be
indicative of a lower potency of this drug to induce full
addiction (Table 2).
A very recent evolution in the way in which pathological
behavior could be analyzed is the one prompted by the
National Institute ofMental Health (NIMH) with the approach
named RDoC (Miller 2010). This is an attempt for a more
endophenotype-based classification, which could allow devel-
oping biological diagnostic markers of psychiatric disease. If
one looks at the behavioral symptoms of pathological drug
intake across the DSM-IV and DSM-5 using an RDoC-like
approach, it appears evident that three dimensions emerge. The
first is characterized by an escalated and sustained drug intake
with an enhanced motivation for the drug, which principally
encompasses the abuse category of the DSM-IV and the mild
and moderate SUD of the DSM-5. The second is characterized
by physiological modifications of drug effects—tolerance and
withdrawal—which are neither necessary nor sufficient condi-
tions for a diagnosis of pathological drug-taking. The third is
loss of control of drug intake, which is a necessary condition
Table 2 Correspondence, across different drugs of abuse, between drug abuse and drug dependence in the DSMIVandmild to moderate SUD (<Severe)
and severe SUD in the DSM 5
DSM-IV
Alcohol n (%) Cocaine n (%) Opioid n (%) Cannabis n (%)
Abuse only Dependence Abuse only Dependence Abuse only Dependence Abuse only Dependence
DSM-V <Severe 931 (99) 569 (15) 171 (99) 422 (10) 115 (100) 168 (7) 876 (99) 692 (33)
Severe 11 (1) 3,238 (85) 11 (1) 4,042 (91) 0 (0) 2,332 (93) 5 (1) 1,395 (67)
Table 1 Comparison of the diagnostic items of drug use related disorders in DSM IVand DSM 5, sufficient and necessary conditions for a diagnosis of
addiction and corresponding major behavioral dimensions usable within an RDoC-like approach to behavioral pathologies
DSM IV criteria for drug abuse (1994) DSM V criteria for Substance Use Disorders (SUDs) (2013)
Necessary 
condition
At least one of these four criteria 0-1 unaffected; 2-3 Mild; 4-5 Moderate; 6 or 
more Severe
1. Recurrent failure to fulfill major role obligations 1. Recurrent failure to fulfill major role obligations
2. Recurrent substance use in physically hazardous 
situations
2. Recurrent substance use in physically hazardous 
situations
3. Recurrent substance-related legal problems
4. Continued substance use despite persistent or 
recurrent social or interpesonal problems
3. Continued substance use despite persistent or 
recurrent social or interpesonal problems
DSM IV criteria for drug addiction (1994)
Three out of these seven criteria
ecnareloT .4ecnareloT .1
lawardhtiW .5lawardhtiW .2
3. The substance is often taken in larger amounts 
or over a longer period than intended
6. The substance is often taken in larger amounts or 
over a longer period than intended
4. Persistent desire  or unsuccessful efforts to cut 
down 
7. Persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut 
down 
8. Craving
5. Considerable time spent in obtaining the 
substance or using, or recovering from its effects 
9. Considerable time spent in obtaining the 
substance or using, or recovering from its effects 
6. Important social, work, or recreational activities 
given up because of use 
10. Important social, work, or recreational activities 
given up because of use 
7. Continued use despite knowledge of problems 
caused by or aggravated by use 
11. Continued use despite knowledge of problems 
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both for a dependence diagnosis in the DSM-IV and severe
SUD in the DSM-5. Based on a synthesis of the three classi-
fication approaches—DSM-IV, DSM-5, and RDoC—we pro-
pose the following: (1) discard physiological adaptations to
drugs (tolerance and withdrawal), as these two phenomena are
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for identifying path-
ological drug use; (2) use the two major categories of behav-
ioral alterations that are either sufficient or necessary condi-
tions to define drug intake as pathological: (a) escalated
sustained drug use; (b) loss of control of drug intake (Table 1).
Transition to addiction in humans is a three-step process
Based on the above considerations, we propose that transition
to addiction is composed of three consecutive and indepen-
dent phases (Fig. 1): consecutive, because entering one phase
is a necessary condition to go to the next one; independent,
because entering one phase is not a sufficient condition to
progress to the next one. The first step is a nonpathological
phase of drug-taking in which there is Recreational Sporadic
(ReS) drug use. The ReS phase starts when the individual
learns to take drugs as one among many of his or her recrea-
tional activities. Drug use is then sporadic and occupies a
small portion of the behavioral repertoire. This can be consid-
ered normal behavior and is present in a large proportion of
the human population when both legal and illegal drugs are
taken into account. The second step, Intensified Sustained
Escalated (ISuE) drug use, starts with an increase in frequen-
cy, amount, and motivation to take drugs. Drug-taking inten-
sifies and becomes sustained; additionally, drug-related prob-
lems appear but are not sufficient to promote spontaneous
abstinence. The ISuE phase is the first moderate pathological
state, one in which the individual takes too much drug but
behavior is still organized and the individually generally well
integrated into society. The third and final step signals the
beginning of the most serious pathological state. In this case,
the individual largely has Loss Control (LoC) of drug intake
and becomes fully addicted. In this phase, drug-taking be-
comes the individual’s major goal-directed activity, invading
most of the space normally occupied by other components of
his or her normal behavioral repertoire. Then, social degrada-
tion is inevitable, and relapses to addiction—even after
prolonged abstinence—is the rule.
It is important to emphasize that during the transition to
addiction, drug intake first changes principally quantitatively
(from recreational to sustained) and then qualitatively (from
sustained to loss of control). In the transition from ReS to
ISuE, the individual progresses from taking drugs sporadically
and moderately to taking them frequently and in large quan-
tity. In contrast, in the transition from ISuE to LoC, the
principal difference is not how much drug is taken but where
the individual is able to confine drug-taking. During ISuE, the
individual still has a good degree of control, so that it remains
largely confined within the boundaries of recreational activi-
ties. During LoC, control of drug intake is largely lost, and the
individual’s behavioral repertoire is invaded by drug-taking
that becomes the major goal-directed behavior. In summary,
during transition to addiction, the drug user first switches from
normal to moderately pathological, taking too much drug
(quantitative change) and from moderately pathological to
fully addicted by losing control of drug-taking (qualitative
change).
Nonpathological, escalated, and fully addicted drug intake
in animals
The voluntary intake of drugs of abuse is a behavior largely
conserved throughout phylogeny. Thus, the preference for
drug-associated environments or the learning of tasks
reinforced by drugs has been found in several species,
including worms, honey bees, rodents, and nonhuman
primates (Siegel 2005). Voluntary drug intake has been a
major subject of experimental research since 1962. This is
largely due to the development of the intravenous drug
self-administration model that showed that in rodents,
drugs can act as positive reinforcers in the operant condi-
tioning paradigm (Weeks 1962). In other words, rodents
can learn to make an operant response—press a lever or
nose-poke in a hole—to obtain intravenous delivery of an
abused drug.
Models of nonpathological recreational sporadic drug use
Pioneering research in experimental psychology and experi-
mental analysis of behaviors (e.g., Skinner 1930, 1950; Dews
1955; Brady 1956; Morse and Skinner 1958; Kelleher 1958;
Dews and Morse 1958; Weiss and Laties 1964; Laties and
Weiss 1966) led to the development of the intravenous self-
administration model in the 1960s and opened the addiction
research field to experimental research (Weeks 1962;
Thompson and Schuster 1964; Pickens and Thompson
1968; Goldberg et al. 1969). The major and fundamental
contribution of these early studies was to demonstrate that
most drugs abused by humans can serve as positive rein-
forcers in laboratory rats and monkeys. However, drug-
reinforced behavior is not per se a model of addiction.
Depending on the circumstances under which it occurs, this
behavior can be a model of nonpathological drug use (ReS),
sustained escalated drug use (ISuE), or the fully addicted state
(LoC). The study of the self-administration using unit doses
above the median effective dose (ED50), fixed ratio sched-
ules, and short access to the drug (1–3 h) for short periods of
time (few weeks) more closely models a normal learning
behavior than a pathological one. These types of procedures
mostly model recreational drug use rather than the later phases
of transition to addiction.
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Models of intensified-sustained-escalated drug use
The first demonstration in animals that something is different
from recreational drug use and is more similar to sustained
escalated drug use was provided using unlimited access to
drugs in monkeys (Johanson et al. 1976), dogs (Risner and
Jones 1976), and rats (Bozarth andWise 1985). It was in these
studies that erratic drug intake and overdosing were first
described. These models can certainly be considered the first
demonstration that it is possible to observe a transition from
moderate drug-taking to sustained and excessive drug use in
laboratory animals. However, these early attempts had two
problems that probably explain why they did not receive the
attention they deserved. The first is that these data paradoxi-
cally suggest that transition to addiction in animals and humans
are two very different phenomena. For example, in these
models, especially with cocaine, animals rapidly overdosed
and died. Although the death of the animals is a most impres-
sive demonstration of excessive drug intake, human drug users
clearly do not massively overdose and die over their first few
contacts with the drug. In fact, although the amount of drug
taken at any stage of pathological drug use—and sometimes
during recreational use—is often impressive, it is quite an
exception that individuals with different degrees of SUD over-
dose. In other words, the type of pathological drug intake
shown in laboratory animals by these early studies is complete-
ly different from that observed in humans. In addition, 24 h/
day access models are difficult to implement in most research
institutes because of ethical and procedural considerations.
At the end of the 1980s, models of ISuE more close to the
human condition started to appear. Investigating individual
differences, we showed (Piazza et al. 1989) that when low-
unit doses of drugs are made available, some rats (high re-
sponders, HRs) rapidly escalated their drug intake, reaching
and maintaining a high level, whereas others (low responders,
LRs) did not. Subsequently, we confirmed and extended this
model by showing that when rats have access to a variety of
unit drug doses, including high doses, HRs will consistently
take a very large quantity of drug, whereas LRs will maintain
moderate levels (Piazza et al. 2000). These differences man-
ifest as an upward shift in the self-administration dose–re-
sponse function in HRs and are associated with a higher
motivation for the drug, as measured using a progressive ratio
reinforcement schedule.
Approximately at the same time, models of sustained drug
intake based on modification of access to drugs regained
broad attention (Ahmed and Koob 1998; Tornatzky and
Miczek 2000; Roberts et al. 2002). Ahmed and Koob (1998)
showed that a phenotype similar to the HR phenotype is also
identified by increasing daily access to the drug from 1 to 6 h.
Long-access rats would escalate drug intake and, similarly to
HRs, would take more drugs over a large range of doses
(Mantsch et al. 2004), showing an upward shift in dose–
response functions. Several complementary lines of evidence
show that an increase in drug intake can be induced by
increasing the exposure of an individual to the drug, as, for
example, repeatedly treating rats with the drug before the start
of the self-administration session (Piazza et al. 1989; Pierre
and Vezina 1997; Vezina et al. 1999; Suto et al. 2002, 2003;
Ferrario and Robinson 2007).
A very thorough study of conditions that can induce the
transition frommoderate to sustained drug intake and increase
motivation for the drug have also been provided by Roberts
et al., who primarily used the progressive ratio reinforcement
schedule. These authors show an upward shift in the ratio-
response function under certain conditions of drug access:
pretreatment with the drug, high-unit dose, and some specific
protocols of extended access [for an extended review, see
Roberts et al. (2007)]. An important conclusion from their
work is that chronic drug intake or extended access is not a
necessary or sufficient condition to increase motivation for the
drug, because under certain extended access conditions and
training with high doses, motivation for the drug can decrease
(Roberts et al. 2002).
From the studies reviewed above, we can infer the behav-
ioral phenotypes that can be used in animals as the basis of a
model of transition from recreational to sustained drug use. In
particular, we propose two phenotypes that show the best face
and construct validity:
1. Acquisition of a high rate of drug self-administration
under conditions of low drug-unit doses and restricted
access (Piazza et al. 1989). Under these conditions, all
rats learn to self-administer drugs during the first few days
of training, but only some vulnerable rats (HRs) escalate
their drug intake, whereas in most rats (LRs), drug intake
decreases. The difference in behavior between HRs and
LRs provides good face validity to the model because
humans who try drugs can be similarly divided into those
who do or do not shift to escalated drug use. One piece of
evidence for the construct validity of the model is that the
HR phenotype can also be induced by conditions known
to favor drug abuse in humans, such as repeated stress
(Piazza et al. 1996; Piazza and Le Moal 1996).
2. Upward shift in self-administration dose–response func-
tions and in the ratio-response functions. Thus, vulnerable
rats will show a sustained drug intake over a large range of
doses and an enhanced motivation to self-administer the
drug. Convergent evidence for the construct validity of
this model is that the upward shift was found by studying
individual differences (HR vs LR) (Piazza et al. 2000) or
by varying conditions of drug access (Suto et al. 2002,
2003), two approaches in which escalation of drug intake
at a fixed dose is observed.
In conclusion, an animal that can acquire sustained drug
intake when low drug-unit doses are used and that shows an
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upward shift in dose–response and ratio-response functions
shows a behavior similar to that of individuals in the ISuE
phase.
Models of loss of control of drug use and full addiction
In the late 1960s, early 1970s (Wikler and Pescor 1967; Wikler
et al. 1971), and early to mid-1990s (Wolffgramm 1991;
Wolffgramm and Heyne 1991; Wolffgramm et al. 2000), the
first attempts were initiated to develop animal models of loss of
control of drug use. Rats were given extended (many months)
oral access to morphine, alcohol, and other drugs. For unknown
reasons, this pioneering research was either largely forgotten or
largely ignored by the addiction research field. In the middle of
the first decade of the twenty-first century, loss of control models
for intravenous self-administration of cocaine were described
(Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004; Vanderschuren and Everitt
2004). Subsequently, a clear distinction between making rats
take drugs and making them addicted began to appear in the
literature (Sanchis-Segura and Spanagel 2006; Roberts et al.
2007; Ahmed 2012; Vanderschuren and Ahmed 2013).
The existence of a fully addicted state with loss of control
in rats was demonstrated in a publication by our group in 2004
(Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004). The paper provided a
multisymptomatic loss of control model that was drawn di-
rectly from the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV. We found
that after prolonged exposure to cocaine, behaviors analogous
to those used to identify loss of control in humans also appear
in some rats. These rats cannot refrain from seeking cocaine
even when they have previously learned that it is no longer
available; become extremely motivated for cocaine, making
thousands of responses for a few drug injections; and keep
responding for cocaine even when its delivery is associated
with adverse consequences, such as an electric shock. As
observed in humans, rats in which loss of control appeared
also showed a high propensity to relapse even after long
periods of withdrawal. A paper published back to back
(Vanderschuren and Everitt 2004) with ours also supported
loss of control of cocaine self-administration by showing that
after extended access to the drug (6 h/day), rats continued to
press a lever in the presence of a cue previously associated
with foot shock. Although there were no contingencies with
adverse consequences of responding for the drug in this setup,
their data suggest that rats can become increasingly resistant to
avoiding lever pressing after longer periods of drug training.
Pelloux et al. (2007) extended these observations to show that
rats with an extended cocaine history were also more resistant
to a punishment contingent with cocaine seeking Critically,
these observations confirmed the predominant role of individ-
ual vulnerability in loss of control over extended drug intake.
Enhanced resistance to punishment was attributable to a sub-
population that showed minimal or no suppression of drug-
seeking behavior (Pelloux et al. 2007).
The bingeing model
We do not propose the bingeing model as a model of transition
to addiction. The main reason is that our approach is based
fundamentally on the behavior of individuals with SUDs and
in particular, on diagnostic criteria or derived behavioral di-
mensions that across the DSM-IV, DSM-5, and RDoC are
either a sufficient or a necessary condition for a diagnosis of
pathological drug-taking. Based on these requirements, we
have not proposed as relevant models of transition to addiction
important drug–induced physiological adaptations, such as
tolerance or withdrawal, which are diagnostic criteria for
SUD but are not necessary or sufficient conditions for a
diagnosis of the disease. Thus, tolerance and withdrawal can
appear in response to medications that do not generate patho-
logical drug-taking.
We believe that bingeing belongs to a similar category as
tolerance and withdrawal. First, bingeing is not explicitly a
diagnostic criterion of SUD. Second, bingeing can be ob-
served in drug users evenwhen they are still in the recreational
phase, as for example, in the weekend bingeing observed in
many recreational drinkers (e.g., college students). As such,
bingeing in itself is not a sufficient condition to identify a
pathological drug intake. Third, if cocaine-addiction-like be-
havior in rats can be associated with a deregulation in drug
intake, i.e., a burst-like pattern of use (Belin et al. 2009a),
close to the one observed in binge access procedures
(Tornatzky and Miczek 2000), the development of bingeing
is neither a necessary condition to the development of
addiction-like behavior (Belin et al. 2011; Kasanetz et al.
2012; Deroche-Gamonet and Piazza, in press) nor a necessary
consequence of prolonged drug intake.
In conclusion, we do not say that binge-like deregulation of
drug intake is not important, but studying it independent of
specific addiction-associated dimensions carries the risk of
studying a phenomenon that may not be related to the shift
from normal to pathological drug use.
Conclusions: three makes it simpler, not more complicated
Animal models now provide approaches to efficiently study
the three steps that constitute the process of transition to
addiction: (1) learning non pathological drug intake (ReS
phase), studied over the first few weeks of self-administration
training with short drug access: this is basically a normal
behavior that would be observed in response to any positive
reinforcer; (2) development of the ISuE phase in which drug
intake increases and becomes sustained over a large range of
doses, either because of individual vulnerabilities or extended
access to drugs; (3) development of the LoC phase in which
loss of control of drug intake leads to a fully addicted state.
This classification has the potential to help simplify and
clarify the interpretation of data obtained in addiction
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research. In fact, what today are often presented as alternative
models or approaches to addiction appear now as models of
the different phases of the addiction process. In parallel,
alternative views of the psychobiological and neurobiological
basis of addiction become different substrates of the different
phases of the addiction process. Finally, keeping in mind the
behavior of addicts and the three steps of transition to addic-
tion also provides a framework to help develop new pertinent
models and understanding of addiction.
Section 2: transition to addiction depends
on an individual–drug interaction
Theories of addiction
Based on experimental data, two main theoretical frameworks
have been proposed to explain transition to addiction: drug-
centered and individual-centered theories. These two groups
of theories were initially derived from two common clinical
observations, respectively: (1) transition to addiction occurs
only after prolonged drug use (drug centered); (2) transition to
addiction is observed only in a limited number of drug users
(individual centered).
Drug-centered theories
Drug-centered theories of addiction are the ones most often
followed in experimental research. This family of theories
includes all views of addiction for which taking a drug repeat-
edly is the major cause of addiction. According to these
theories, addiction is principally a consequence of drug intake
and results from the psychopharmacological changes that
follow chronic drug use. Theories regarding this group fo-
cused on specific drug-induced changes, such as tolerance
(Roberts et al. 2002), sensitization (Wise and Bozarth 1987;
Robinson and Berridge 1993, 2000, 2008), withdrawal and
allostasis (Koob and LeMoal 2005, 2008a, b) or drug-induced
cognitive changes in impulsivity (Jentsch and Taylor 1999),
decision making (Bechara 2001, 2005), and conditioning
(Robbins et al. 2008a). These views of addiction were
reinforced by the very significant neurobiological alterations
at molecular, cellular (Nestler 1992; Nestler et al. 1993;
Nestler 1994; Nestler and Aghajanian 1997; Nestler 2000),
synaptic (Hyman et al. 2006; Kauer and Malenka 2007), and
network levels (Wolf 1998; Everitt and Wolf 2002; Wolf
2002, 2010a, b) that follow chronic drug intake. More recent-
ly, they have also been strengthened by observations showing
that the longer the within- or between-day exposure to a drug,
the greater the likelihood of increases in drug intake (Ahmed
and Koob 1998) and subsequent appearance of signs of loss of
control (Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004).
Individual-centered theories
Individual-centered theories of addiction are fundamentally
inspired by observations in humans, which are well summa-
rized by Charles P. O’Brien, who stated: “Some addicts go for
months or years using heroin or cocaine only on weekends
before becoming a daily (addicted) user. Others report that
they had such an intense positive response that they became
addicted with the first dose…” (O’Brien et al. 1986). For this
group of theories, drugs are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the development of addiction. According to this
theoretical framework, addiction results from a pathological
response to the drug that is generated in a few individuals by a
vulnerable biological phenotype. Several experimental obser-
vations strengthen the hypothesis of the existence of a drug-
vulnerable phenotype. Indeed, in rodents, large differences in
vulnerability to escalate drug intake have been repeatedly
shown either within outbred rat strains or between inbredmice
strains. The main differences between theories in this family
principally concern different degrees of etiological relevance
given to genetic factors (Crabbe et al. 1999; Ellenbroek et al.
2005; Foroud et al. 2010; Meyer et al. 2010; Crabbe et al.
2010), environmental factors (Piazza et al. 1996; Goeders
2002; Bardo et al. 2013), developmental factors (Koehl et al.
2002; Barron et al. 2005; Doremus-Fitzwater et al. 2010), and
gene + environment interactions (Cabib et al. 2000; van der
Kam et al. 2005; Caspi and Moffitt 2006).
Addiction: drugs or individuals?
Research in laboratory animals during the last 20 years has
progressively demonstrated that individual vulnerabilities to
drugs exist and are due to underlying biological factors that
mediate transition to addiction.
Individual vulnerabilities exist and are a necessary condition
to transition to addiction
Beside phenotypic vulnerabilities, one possible origin of indi-
vidual differences is experimental error. Thus, especially in
operant learning, even small differences in experimental set-
tings can induce large differences in learning. For example, a
small difference in the contingency between response and
delivery of the reinforcement can induce large differences in
rates of acquisition of drug self-administration. How can we
determine the difference between phenotypic differences and
experimental error when, by definition, we cannot eliminate
experimental error? How do we rule out something that by
definition cannot be eliminated or systematically controlled?
Obviously, we cannot.
If experimental error cannot be eliminated, what can be
done, however, is to show that the observed differences be-
tween individuals do not result from experimental error.
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Experimental error is by definition not predictable. Thus,
behavioral differences arising from an experimental error
should not be predictable by variations in another independent
phenotype. In other words, if we can predict individual differ-
ences in self-administration on the basis of behaviors observed
in other procedures, then what is observed is, by definition,
not an error. This was shown in our 1989 publication (Piazza
et al. 1989) in which we demonstrated that a higher locomotor
response to stress predicted individual vulnerability to rapid
escalation in drug intake and maintenance of high levels of
drug intake. These observations were confirmed shortly after
by results from our group and others showing that HR rats had
a higher preexisting dopaminergic activity (Piazza et al.
1991b; Hooks et al. 1992; Rougé-Pont et al. 1993) and a
higher corticosterone secretion in response to stress (Piazza
et al. 1991a) than did LR rats.
These data were replicated and extended by several groups,
confirming that individual differences exist and depend on
biological differences. However, such data did not address
another major issue: would individual differences also exist
in the real word? Thus, we and others studied individual
differences in drug self-administration using low-unit drug
doses (e.g., Piazza et al. 1989; Pierre and Vezina 1997). This
experimental condition is indeed very different from the one
observed in the real world, where humans can freely titrate
their ideal dose. In other words, the model used to identify
individual differences in the laboratory showed differences in
threshold sensitivities to the drug that could be irrelevant in
the human condition. Translated into pharmacological terms,
this is, in fact, a very serious issue that needs to be addressed.
General pharmacology tells us that individual differences in
drug effects could originate from differences either in potency
or efficacy, the two variables that classically characterize
dose–response curves. So how is all this relevant to
individual-based addiction theories?
Changes in potency (changes in sensitivity to the drug) are
translated to horizontal shifts in the dose–response function.
In this case, a vulnerable individual, compared with a more
resistant one, would have a left shift in the dose–response
function. Response intensity would be identical in all individ-
uals, with the only difference being the dose at which the
maximal response is obtained: lower in vulnerable individuals
and higher in resistant ones. Therefore, if the dose is not an
issue when the individual can freely choose the ideal dose, as
in the real world, then individual differences are not likely to
play a key role in determining transition to addiction.
Changes in efficacy, a measure of the maximum possible
intensity of drug effect, are indicated by a vertical shift in the
dose–response function. In this case, a vulnerable individual will
have an upward shift in the dose–response function, and nomatter
the dose, this individual will self-administer a larger quantity of
drug than a nonvulnerable individual. Consequently, even under
conditions in which the dose of the drug can be freely titrated,
some vulnerable individuals will escalate to drug abuse, whereas
resistant individuals will maintain a moderate drug intake.
Vertical, not horizontal, shifts in dose–response functions
explain individual differences in drug self-administration.
Thus, when a large range of doses was used, individual
differences not only persisted but were amplified. Some rats
(HRs) would constantly self-administer large amounts of co-
caine (vertical upward shift in the dose–response function),
whereas others (LRs) took very low amounts (vertical down-
ward shift in the dose–response function) (Piazza et al. 2000).
In addition, the reinforcing effects of cocaine, as assessed in a
progressive ratio reinforcement schedule, were higher in rats
taking more of the drug and lower in rats taking less. Thus, it
appears that independent of dose, cocaine has a higher
reinforcing efficacy in some individuals, who will rapidly
escalate drug intake.
The last but not least major issue to be addressed in order to
establish the role of individual vulnerabilities is to show that
these vulnerabilities are relevant to full addiction. Thus, as seen
earlier, HR and LR are at best models of ISuE drug use but not
of the most severe SUD, which is characterized by loss of
control. This issue was one of the most complicated to address,
in part because true addiction was once largely considered a
purely human condition. To address this issue, in rats self-
administering cocaine, we operationalized the DSM-IV diag-
nostic criteria related to loss of control and evaluated these
criteria at regular intervals (Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004).
Criteria were: (1) high motivation for the drug (items 5 and
6), measured by a progressive ratio reinforcement schedule; (2)
inability to refrain from drug seeking, even if the drug was not
available (items 3 and 4), measured by active responses during
periods of signaled drug nonavailability; (3) drug use despite
negative consequences (item 7), measured by resistance to
foot-shock-induced punishment at cocaine self-administration.
After short or intermediate exposures to cocaine (up to
40 days; daily sessions of 2 h/day), no rat showed any of the
three criteria of addiction. After this period and up to 3 months
of self-administration, the three addiction-like behaviors
appeared in a small percentage of rats (∼20 %), whereas the
largest proportion of rats maintained good control over drug
intake. These individual differences were not dependent on
the daily amount of the drug taken by the individual. Thus,
rats that did or did not develop addiction-like behavior had an
identical intake of cocaine during the entire drug self-
administration period (3 months).
These findings lead to three major conclusions: (1) full
addiction is not a purely human phenomenon but also exists
in laboratory rats; (2) despite the use of a large amount of drug
over a prolonged period, most individuals are resistant to
addiction; (3) some of the nosographic constructions used to
classify psychiatric diseases in humans correspond to unitary
behavioral dimensions in laboratory animals. More generally,
our studies suggest that it is possible to develop new
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models of psychiatric diseases that bridge a dimensional
and nosographic approach and truly mimic/simulate the
human condition.
Not one but at least two independent vulnerabilities
One completely unexpected but important finding of our 2004
publication was that vulnerability to loss of control was
completely unrelated to vulnerability to sustained drug use.
Thus, locomotor response to stress (HR and LR), anxiety-like
behavior, and some measure of impulsivity, which predicted
vulnerability to the development of sustained drug intake
(Piazza et al. 1989; Bush and Vaccarino 2007; Anker et al.
2009; Marusich and Bardo 2009; Schramm-Sapyta et al.
2011), did not predict or were associated with the develop-
ment of addiction-like behavior (Deroche-Gamonet et al.
2004; Belin et al. 2008). The distinction between the ISuE-
prone and the LoC-prone phenotype was confirmed by Belin
et al. (2008), who showed again that although HRs and LRs
have an upward shift in the dose–response function (Piazza
et al. 2000; Belin et al. 2008), they do not differ in addiction-
like behavior (Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004; Belin et al.
2008). The discovery of this distinction is important because
it shows that completing the transition to addiction requires
having two independent vulnerability phenotypes. The first,
like the one found in HR and LR (Piazza et al. 1989), predis-
poses individuals to switch from recreational drug use to
sustained escalated drug use. The second is responsible for
the shift to loss of control in individuals in whom drug use is
already sustained. Recent publications (Kasanetz et al. 2010,
2012) support the existence of these two independent pheno-
types by showing that vulnerability to loss of control is asso-
ciated with a different type of biological modification than the
vulnerability to develop sustained escalated drug use.
How many vulnerable individuals?
To evaluate the role of individual vulnerabilities in the sequen-
tial steps of transition to addiction, it is important to estimate
how many individuals actually make those transitions. This is
a tricky question to answer unitarily because different depen-
dent variables are measured in the two phases of transition to
addiction and the individual vulnerabilities involved are of a
very different nature.
How many individuals are vulnerable to develop sustained
drug intake? In animal models of ISuE as well as in humans,
analyzed variables are principally quantitative. Drug use in the
recreational phase is sporadic and generally moderate, where-
as in the escalated phase, it becomes frequent and sustained.
This principally quantitative difference between use and abuse
has generated complicated discussions about the threshold
that should be used in humans to differentiate the two phases;
in other words, how much drug is too much?
This difficulty of establishing in humans a clear-cut thresh-
old may be explained in laboratory animal studies that show
that individual differences in drug intake intensity follows a
normal distribution—or actually, a log-normal distribution
that becomes normal after data log transformation. The normal
distribution of drug intake intensity means that vulnerability to
drug abuse is distributed along a continuumwithout a clearcut
threshold between normal and too much or between resistant
and vulnerable. This is why in humans, normal and too much
is largely determined by arbitrary social conventions, and
sometimes by health consequences that cannot be confidently
foreseen. In animal studies, too, arbitrary thresholds are used
to separate vulnerable and resistant individuals; depending on
the authors, the upper 33rd or the upper 50th percentile has
been defined as the vulnerable subset. However, the fact that a
difference can be seen using a 50/50 split indicates that the
Gaussian distribution is quite flat and that practically an
equivalent number of individuals take moderate and high
amounts of drugs, respectively.
The normal distribution describing drug intake in animals
also explains why several publications show that the develop-
ment of sustained escalated drug intake is strongly influenced
by drug availability (Ahmed and Koob 1998; Roberts et al.
2002). If sporadic recreational drug use and sustained escalated
drug use are two ends of a continuum, then a shift from one to
the other condition can be obtained by changing independently
the vulnerability of the individual or exposure to the drug. This
is why in protocols using extended access, as with the one used
by Ahmed and Koob (1998), an increase in drug intake can be
observed in a number of individuals that is large enough to be
studied behaviorally or neurobiologically by simple group
comparison without taking into account individual differences.
When using models of sustained drug use, it is then impor-
tant to set drug availability within a range that best mimics the
human condition. In humans, by definition, drug access dur-
ing the recreational phase is quite restricted, principally be-
cause of the large space occupied by competing activities. In
many cases, the intensification of drug use is also initially
opposed by the increase in drug-related expenses. This is
probably at least part of the reason that most human drug
users never shift to sustained escalated drug intake. As a
consequence, we believe that the best models of human tran-
sition to pathological sustained escalated drug use are the ones
using restricted access to drugs and in which the development
of abuse-like behavior is not observed in a majority of
individuals.
Models in which animals are offered the choice between
drugs and competing activities are certainly alternatives to
restricted-access procedures (Ahmed et al. 2013). Although
these models seem to have higher face validity (Kalivas 2005)
than restricted-access ones, they are also procedurally much
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more complicated. The field would certainly benefit from a
direct comparison of the two approaches in order to evaluate
their respective advantages and drawbacks.
In conclusion, it is difficult to determine an absolute num-
ber of individuals who will shift from sporadic recreational
drug use to sustained escalated drug use, because this percent-
age depends on the interaction between individual vulnerabil-
ity and drug exposure. As a consequence, in a general popu-
lation, it is likely that the more a drug is easily available, the
higher the number of individuals who will shift from recrea-
tional use to pathological escalated use.
How many individuals are vulnerable to loss of control and
become fully addicted? The percentage of individuals vulner-
able to develop loss of control and become fully addicted can
be more precisely calculated, and this phenotype seems resis-
tant to changes in external contingency, such as the extent of
daily drug access. These differences between escalation-prone
and addiction-prone phenotypes are because the two pheno-
types are of very different natures and are measured in very
different ways. When vulnerability to addiction is studied
using the three addiction-like behaviors to define the pheno-
type, only a small percentage of rats (17 %) show a complete
manifestation of the phenotype (presence of three intense
addiction-like behaviors), whereas most individuals maintain
perfect control (41 %, no addiction-like behaviors) or good
control (27 %, one addiction-like behavior) over drug intake.
The different associations between these three behaviors in
different individuals are not artifacts of the classification.
Thus, in a factorial analysis, they all load on the same factor.
This is probably why changing the criteria for intensity that
are used to determine whether each behavior is positive or
negative does not significantly change the final percentage of
addict rats but maintains it in a range (16–20 %) that appears
similar to that observed in humans (Belin and Deroche-
Gamonet 2012).
The different natures of vulnerability to escalated and
sustained drug use and to full addiction are also shown by
the apparent insensitivity of the loss of control prone pheno-
type to changes in drug availability.We tried to find conditions
that speed up the process of transition to addiction and thus
increase the final number of addict rats for obvious experi-
mental needs. The first thing we attempted (Deroche-
Gamonet and Piazza, unpublished results) was to increase
daily access to cocaine, increasing it from 2 to 6 h. As
discussed earlier, this is a common procedure used to increase
the number of individuals that escalate in sustained drug use.
However, we were unable to increase the final number of
addicted animals or accelerate the addiction process. Probably
one reason for this relative insensitivity to changes in drug
availability in the loss of control phenotype is because at least
one of the addiction-like behaviors is not normally distributed
but follows a bimodal distribution, which automatically
restricts the excursion that a given phenotype can show in
response to contingent factors.
In conclusion, interaction between the degree of drug expo-
sure and individual vulnerability in determining the shift from
sporadic to sustained drug use and from sustained drug use to
addiction seems to follow different rules. Thus, the percentage
of individuals who will escalate in drug intake can be increased
by extending the daily duration of drug availability. In contrast,
the addiction phenotype seems insensitive to within-day
changes in drug availability and more dependent on the dura-
tion of drug exposure over days, necessitating at least 2 months
of drug self-administration for addiction-like behaviors to ap-
pear even in the few vulnerable individuals. It is noteworthy
that although intensified drug use has been found using several
types of drugs, the shift to the LoC phase has only been studied
with cocaine. It is then possible that the difficulty of increasing
the number of subjects shifting to the LoC phase by modifying
drug exposure, as described above, may not apply to other
drugs (Badiani et al. 2011).
Individual vulnerabilities are a necessary condition
to develop addiction
In conclusion, research in laboratory animals during the last
20 years demonstrates that individual vulnerabilities to drugs
exist and are a necessary condition to first develop sustained
drug use and then escalate to loss of control and full addiction.
Transition to addiction is not mediated by one but by two
distinct vulnerable phenotypes: the first phenotype promotes
drug escalation and the shift to the ISuE phase, the second
triggers the shift to the LoC phase (Deroche-Gamonet and
Piazza 2010). The necessity of having two distinct and inde-
pendent vulnerable phenotypes to complete the transition to
addiction explains why only a small number of individuals
exposed to drugs develop the most severe form of the disease.
Implications of drug-centered and individual-centered
theories for medical and societal approaches to addiction
Why is it important to reconcile the two families of theories?
Why is it important to accept that although taking drugs is a
necessary condition for developing an addiction, it is not
sufficient alone, and that transition to addiction occurs only
in some vulnerable individuals? The reason is simple: The two
families of theories generate opposite scientific, medical, and
social conceptions of addiction and suggest different ways of
dealing with this health problem.
Implications for disease classification
In the framework of drug-centered theories, addiction is ap-
proximated to an iatrogenic disease. An iatrogenic disease
literally means a disease that is induced by a physician (iatros,
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Greek for physician), but this definition is more generally used
to indicate diseases that result from the acute or chronic intake
of prescription/therapeutic drugs. Classically, side effects of
therapeutic drugs, those described in the drug labelling, are
iatrogenic diseases. Even more generally, the definition of
iatrogenic disease can be extended to the side effects of
pharmacological compounds that are taken for other desired
effects.
In the case of the drug-centered vision of addiction, this
classification seems appropriate for two major reasons: (1)
Drugs of abuse are pharmacological compounds that are taken
because they induce intoxication—a state highly desired by
our species—and that have a major side effect, i.e., addiction.
(2) Most drugs were initially introduced for their therapeutic
properties, as, for example, cocaine as a local anesthetic and
morphine as an analgesic. The same situation in reverse ap-
plies to cannabis, which is now prescribed in certain condi-
tions for medical purposes.
Under individual-centered theories, addiction should be
considered a true psychiatric disease. Thus, most psychiatric
diseases are related to stimuli largely innocuous for the gen-
eral population but that are nevertheless highly pathological
for a subset of vulnerable individuals. Examples of vulnera-
bility are people with depression, anxiety disorders, and
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The major causes of
reactive depression in France are divorce and moving from
one house to another; such events are generally well endured
by the general population. Similarly, anxiety disorders can be
associated with stimuli, such as spiders, snakes, and elevators,
which do not induce pathological reactions in most people,
although they are very often experienced as unpleasant.
Finally, even the most traumatic experiences are dealt with
efficiently by the largest portion of the population, and only
some individuals develop PTSD. Consequently, if, as postu-
lated by individual-centered theories, taking drugs is not a
sufficient condition for addiction (which occurs only in some
vulnerable individuals), then there is no reason to classify
addiction differently from other psychiatric diseases.
Implications for research and social policies
From a scientific point of view, drug-centered theories suggest
that our major efforts should be to identify and reverse the
brain modifications induced by drug exposure. From a social
and political standpoint, major efforts should be devoted to
preventing exposure to particular drugs, either by repressive
measures or preventive actions. Indeed, when a therapeutic
drug shows serious side effects, the appropriate response is to
stop its commercialization, forbid access to it, and alert the
public to its dangers. Conversely, if the individual-centered
vision of addiction is correct, research should focus on iden-
tifying the biological basis of vulnerability to drugs with the
goal of reversing such vulnerability in order to treat addiction.
In particular, this type of research should identify phenotypes
predisposing to transition to addiction and the drug-induced
adaptations that selectively appear in individuals who develop
addiction. From a social and political standpoint, as addiction
is one among other psychiatric diseases, health and research
measures should be promoted. We do not forbid divorce,
moving, and wars or eradicate spiders, snakes, and elevators,
although such measures would probably substantially de-
crease the prevalence of depression, anxiety, and PTSD.
However, suggesting such courses of actions as the principal
approach to fighting these psychiatric diseases would proba-
bly not be well received.
It could be argued that divorce, moving, wars, spiders,
snakes, elevators, are “natural” behaviors or elements that also
play a positive role in the preservation of our species and our
environment, whereas drugs are artificial stimuli that do not
have such a function.
However, if drugs are unnatural, nonuseful, artificial stim-
uli, why do we keep two of them legal—alcohol and tobacco,
which are the principal causes of health problems? This is
because drugs are not always harmful, and their use is not
unnatural. One of the most easily identified functions of drugs
is their stress-relieving and anxiolytic effects, which certainly
have an important role in helping individuals function in most
human societies that are largely very demanding, often unjust,
and practically never egalitarian. Also, as we have seen,
getting high by different means is one of the principal activ-
ities in humans. Experiencing a high, therefore, has the fea-
tures of a strong innate drive that cannot be considered unnat-
ural. Thus, we generally consider “natural” what exists today
because of a selection process and “unnatural” what we have
artificially created. Certainly, we have not created the drive for
getting high; it is one of the most rooted innate drives in the
human species.
Adequacy of current social trends
Most developed nations have implicitly endorsed drug-
centered theories of addiction: most public money spent on
addiction goes to repressive and preventive measures, and
most publicly funded addiction research investigates the ef-
fects of chronic drug intake on brain physiology. Finally, in
most countries, an addict is regarded not as someone who has
a psychiatric pathology but as someone who became addicted
to a drug because of a lack of will—as someone with a vice. It
is important to emphasize that the fate we reserve for addicts is
quite different from that of individuals with well-accepted
psychiatric diseases, such as depression or schizophrenia. In
the latter cases, even individuals performing major crimes go
to psychiatric facilities to be treated and not to prison, as most
often happens to addicts.
On the basis of the observations summarized in this sec-
tion, we believe that this societal approach to addiction should
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change profoundly because addiction seems to have all the
characteristics of a typical psychiatric disease. Do we regard a
depressed patient as someone who is lazy and does not want to
go to work or someone with PTSD as an individual with no
guts? Certainly not; and in Europe, at least, depressed and
PTSD patients are taken care by publicly funded healthcare
systems, with their absence from work financially compensat-
ed and their treatment costs refunded. Why? Because we
believe that the individual is not to blame for the limitations
associated with his or her disease. A similar treatment should
then be reserved for addicts. If addiction develops principally
in vulnerable individuals, as posited by the individual-
centered vision of addiction, addicts are not individuals who
have poor judgment and a vice but patients afflicted by a
psychiatric disease.
It could be argued that although addiction it is not a vice, it
is nevertheless a vice-like disease. First-time users have prob-
abilistic knowledge that recreational use might lead to addic-
tion. In other words, addiction would not be a 100 % true
disease because it would arise from a risk-taking behavior. An
appropriate way to address this argument is to ask whether
conditions are not considered as true diseases when they arise
from risk-taking behaviors. The answer to this question is
clearly no. A large portion of cases of diseases for which
etiological factors are known derive from risk-taking behav-
ior. Many cases of very serious metabolic and cardiovascular
diseases and infectious and traumatic diseases could be
avoided by modifying behaviors that put us at risk.
The subsequent argument of a vice-like vision of addiction
is that most of the above-mentioned diseases deserve to be
endured by the afflicted individual because they result from
too strong a push from the natural instincts that are fundamen-
tal to preserving the individual and the species, such as food
and sex. Following this argument, we should then start
looking with suspicion and not consider as true diseases many
other conditions. Just to make a few examples, we should not
consider as true diseases the multiple muscular and articular
problems that result from several high-risk sports and body
training activities. In fact, it is very complicated to justify the
evolutionary usefulness of certain sports, including American
football, car races, mountain skiing, sky diving, and even
tennis. It would be also difficult to argue on a relative scale
that risky sports (and why not fat-enriched food) have a
usefulness superior to the stress- and pressure-relieving effects
of drugs that help individuals to cope with society and main-
tain societal peace.
In conclusion, we believe there is no reason we should not
consider pathological drug-taking as a true disease.
Nonpathological drug-taking is a behavior for which we have
a strong innate drive and that has an identifiable social func-
tion. Pathological drug-taking is, then, exactly like other psy-
chiatric diseases, being the result of the interaction between a
vulnerable phenotype and stimuli that are not pathogenic, but
could be considered useful, for the general population. If this
view is correct, most human societies are using the wrong
approach to fighting addiction, and societal behaviors toward
this disease should change profoundly.
Section 3: psychobiological basis of transition to addiction
This section is not an extensive review of the literature but a
description of several pertinent examples that support the
existence of three concatenated, independent steps in the
transition to addiction. For this reason, we apologize in ad-
vance to our colleagues who have produced very important
work that is not cited here.
Psychobiological basis of recreational, sporadic drug use
Activation of the brain substrate of natural reinforcers
mediates the learning of drug use
The first phase of addiction is a learning process based on
drugs of abuse activating the same brain substrates that medi-
ate the positive reinforcing effects of natural reinforcers. The
study and discovery of this fundamental basic mechanism was
the focus of the early days of the addiction research field.
Thus, for the most part, our neurobiological knowledge de-
rives from studies using limited-access and behavioral proce-
dures, such as conditioned place preference. As a conse-
quence, most knowledge we have today concerns “normal”
recreational drug use rather than pathological drug use.
However, many important contributions have been made in
this context, in particular, identification of the crucial role of
activation of the mesocorticolimbic dopamine system.
Briefly, the general idea that was progressively put forward
and is still largely believed is that drugs of abuse increases
dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens and, in particular,
in the shell of this nucleus, and that this biological change
mediates their appetitive effects. Using complementary ap-
proaches, the work of the Di Chiara group (Di Chiara and
Imperato 1988), the Concordia group (Wise 1978, 1984,
1987; Kalivas and Stewart 1991; Wise 1994), and of the
Koob and Le Moal groups (Le Moal et al. 1979; Koob et al.
1989) are fundamental in proving this concept. Later on, the
dopamine-activated downstream intracellular signals, such as
adenylate cyclase (Self and Nestler 1995), and the mitogen-
activated protein kinase (MAPK) pathways (Valjent et al.
2004) have been discovered and characterized.
An important role of dopamine and of its downstream
intracellular mechanisms was also extended to conditioned
stimuli associated with drug delivery. Such stimuli become
important discriminative stimuli of drug availability and, un-
der some training conditions, secondary reinforcers. The idea
here is that the increase in dopamine is backward-shifted and
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is now activated by discriminative stimuli that predict drug
availability more than by the drug itself (Wanat et al. 2009). It
is noteworthy that exactly the same phenomenon happens
with natural reinforcers, showing that these neurobiological
mechanisms activated by drugs are part of the normal learning
sequence of the behaviors directed at acquiring any kind of
appetitive stimulus (Schultz et al. 1997).
Liking drugs is the major substrate of drug use
As the majority of research in the first 30 years of the addiction
research field was performed using models of recreational
drug use and not of the later phase of transition of addiction,
it is not surprising that one of the first interpretations of drug
addiction was actually the explanation of why we take drugs
recreationally, or in other words, why drugs can act as positive
reinforcers. This initial theory can be summarized by saying
that we become addicted because we strongly like (Wise and
Bozarth 1982) or want (Robinson and Berridge 1993) drugs,
and we like or want drugs because they, or cues associated
with them (Stewart et al. 1984), activate mesolimbic dopa-
mine. We believe that this theory cannot explain the entire
process of transition to addiction. In contrast, we think that
this is a sound explanation of why we use drugs recreationally.
Certainly, the primary reinforcing effects of the drugs and the
perception of positive effects are the major reasons we learn to
use drugs of abuse.
Overactivation of dopamine transmission is why drugs
are extremely likeable and wanted stimuli
Despite the fact that learning to obtain drugs and food is
mediated by identical brain substrates, drugs of abuse are
described by most users as more salient and appetitive than
natural reinforcers. Why is that? Two reasons can be ad-
vanced: (1) increase in dopamine induced by most drugs is
significantly higher than that induced by natural reinforcers;
(2) increase in dopamine induced by natural reinforcers rap-
idly habituates; however, this does not occur, or at least occurs
more slowly, in response to drugs of abuse (Bassareo and Di
Chiara 1997; Di Chiara 1998).
How dopamine makes us like or want drugs is still unclear,
and the initial idea that dopamine is the neurotransmitter of
pleasure seems increasingly implausible today. In particular,
pleasure is defined as the sensation we perceive during the
consummatory phase of a primary reinforcer: tasting the food,
reaching the climax. However, in our pleasurable relationship
with positive reinforcers, the ultimate consummatory phase is
just a small component of the entire behavioral sequence
leading to them. What we also strongly respond to is the sight
of the stimulus and to its predictors. Salience of the stimuli or
how attractive they look is then a very important hedonic
dimension of our lives. It is fundamental in controlling and
motivating behavior even more than the sensation we receive
from the final consummatory phase. We believe that this is the
role of an increase in dopamine: to light up stimuli, to increase
their salience, and to make them strongly pleasant and irre-
sistibly appetitive without the need to actually consume them
(Schultz et al. 1997; Robinson and Berridge 2000). This is a
tremendous power that justifies why the dopaminergic re-
sponse to natural reinforcers and their predictors is moderate
and habituates quickly and explains why, when this does not
happen—as for drugs of abuse—the stimuli stand out and are
perceived as strongly appetitive.
Is there a role of individual differences in recreational drug
use?
Given the large number of humans that use drugs
recreationally, and the observation that most animals learn to
self-administer drugs (approximately 90 % of the population
in both cases), we believe that the question should be turned
around to ask whether there is a psychobiological “resistance”
to using a drug recreationally. The answer is probably yes,
since, as we said before, there are few laboratory animals that
do not learn to self-administer drugs and few humans that do
not take any type of drug. One possible explanation for this
behavior is that drugs are aversive and not appetitive in these
few individuals. This is a likely possibility, because drugs of
abuse, particularly cocaine, are complex stimuli that possess
both aversive and appetitive properties, with their final effects
resulting from the algebraic summation of the two (Ettenberg
2004). Thus, if in some individuals the aversive effects of
drugs outweigh their rewarding effects, then they will avoid
drugs of abuse (Schechter 1992). Although this seems a likely
hypothesis, to our knowledge, the mechanisms of resistance to
recreational drug use have not been directly studied. Although
recent investigations start elucidating why drugs, and in par-
ticular psychostimulants, can be aversive (Wenzel et al. 2011;
O’Neill et al. 2013; Jhou et al. 2013), this hypothesis remains
mainly speculative and needs direct validation.
Psychobiological basis of intensified, sustained, escalated
drug use
For transition from physiology (drug use) to pathophysiology
(sustained drug use and loss of control), we must go
from independent to relevants variables
Knowledge of many neurobiological substrates involved in
addiction that the research field, including ourselves, has iden-
tified so far is based on data collected after few weeks of
exposure to drugs or from data obtained from noncontingent,
limited drug exposure in locomotor sensitization studies
(Piazza et al. 1996; Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2003; Kalivas
and Volkow 2005; Nestler 2005; Hyman et al. 2006; Koob
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and Le Moal 2008a, b; Robbins et al. 2008b; Robinson and
Berridge 2008; Ambroggi et al. 2009). This time frame is too
short to allow the development of addiction-like behavior. As a
consequence, most of these neurobiological changes more
likely concern the mechanisms of the transition from recrea-
tional to sustained drug use than the substrate of loss of control
and full addiction.
For some of these studies, a central issue is then to under-
stand which of the proposed drug-induced modifications me-
diate sustained drug use. Drugs of abuse have a large number
of biological effects, but very few of those effects are abuse
related. Just comparing drug-treated animals with drug-naive
animals does not allow distinguishing abuse-related from
abuse-unrelated effects. In addition, most of these studies were
done using a small number of rats or mice and without taking
into account individual differences. As a limited number of
individuals develop sustained drug use and finally addiction, it
is possible that the observed changes reflect what happens in
the brain of individuals resistant to drugs, which represent the
majority of individuals within a population. As a conse-
quence, some of the proposed putative mechanisms of addic-
tion could be either completely unrelated to it or, alternatively,
mechanisms of resistance to transition to addiction.
What approach will allow us to identify with a good degree
of confidence the biological basis of transition to drug abuse
and then to addiction? The answer to this question is simple:
we should stop using approaches that are valid for physiolog-
ical studies and start using approaches that are adapted to
pathophysiological investigations. Physiology is discovering
what the biological mechanisms (independent variables) are
of a given bodily function (dependent variable). In this con-
text, practically all biological factors for which manipulations
modifies the target function can be safely defined as a neces-
sary or sufficient condition of that function and is therefore
part of its physiology.
Pathophysiological studies go one step further and attempt
to identify the variables that induce pathology in a physiolog-
ical function rather than attempting to identify all independent
variables. In real life, pathological states do not develop by a
random modification of all variables involved in the physiol-
ogy of the diseased system. They result from deregulation of a
precise subset of independent variables along a precise cas-
cade of events. This specific selection of a subset of indepen-
dent variables in the development of a disease is probably
because pathology is often the result of the failure of an organ
or biological system to adapt to a bodily or environmental
constraint, i.e., the etiological factor of the disease. Adaptation
or failure to do so depends on the adaptive capacity of the
system and from what is called its “functional reserve,” i.e.,
how much that system can be impaired before the function it
subserves is disrupted (Harrison 2011). It is then likely that the
subsets of independent variables involved in a specific path-
ological process are the ones with the smaller functional
reserve. Alternatively, they could also be the independent
variables that play multifunctional roles. Thus, adaptation that
protects one function can be disruptive for another. Clearly,
these are not exhaustive examples of how a pathological state
can occur. They are just few examples aimed at clarifying why
the pathophysiology of a disease selects a subset of the vari-
ables involved in the physiology of the target system. We
propose naming these independent, disease-specific variables
“relevant variables” to differentiate them from the more ge-
neric independent variables involved in physiology.
How do we go, then, from studying independent variables
to identifying relevant ones? The answer was outlined many
years ago by Claude Bernard in his book on fundaments of
experimental medicine (Bernard 1865). A biological factor or
a biological chain of events can be considered a physiopath-
ological mechanism; i.e., an independent variable can be
considered a relevant variable when: (1) changes in its activity
can be correlated with the predisposition of vulnerable indi-
viduals and/or with the appearance of the disease; (2) known
etiological or predisposing external conditions modify the
activity of such a factor; (3) opposite manipulations of such
a factor can induce and reverse the disease.
In other words, to go from physiology to pathophysiology,
we need models that allow either identification of spontane-
ously vulnerable and resistant individuals, or models that use
known etiological factors to induce the disease in a subgroup
of individuals. This is particularly important when, as in the
case of transition to addiction, only a small percentage of
individuals exposed to the pathogen (the drug) develop the
disease. It is only by comparing individuals exposed to drugs
who do or do not develop sustained drug use followed by loss
of control that we can distinguish the three major families of
variables that can be modified by drug exposure: (1) variables
unrelated to transition to addiction, which will be modified in
all individuals; (2) variables that protect against developing
sustained drug use and loss of control, which will be modified
in individuals who do not develop addiction; (3) variables
involved in sustained drug use and loss of control, which will
be modified in individuals who will develop these patholog-
ical behaviors.
For these reasons, in the following paragraph, we discuss
only some of the data that we believe can be specifically
related to the pathophysiology of transition to sustained drug
use and not all psychobiological modifications induced by
repeated exposure to drugs.
Sensitized dopamine: a pathophysiological mechanism
of transition to intensified drug use
Sensitization has become a complicated word to use in the
drug-abuse research field because many different meanings
have been attached to it. Originally, sensitization is the oppo-
site of tolerance. Tolerance refers to a decrease in a drug effect
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over repeated exposure to the drug. Sensitization defines the
converse phenomenon: an increase in drug effect over repeat-
ed drug exposure. By definition, the motivational effects of
drugs increase, or sensitize, during transition to escalated and
sustained drug use. If the motivational effects underwent
tolerance, individuals would take increasingly less drug and
not increasingly more. Although this seems logical, for a long
time, the opposite was argued: individuals would take in-
creased amounts of the drug because they felt their effects
less. The debate between tolerance and sensitization has long
animated the drug-abuse research field.
In the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, we and others
demonstrated that individuals who were vulnerable for
esclation to drug use had a spontaneously sensitized dopami-
nergic system (Piazza et al. 1991b; Hooks et al. 1992) and a
very high response to initial drug exposure (Hooks et al. 1991).
Over the same period, we also showed that this sensitized
response and the associated vulnerability to escalate to
sustained drug use could be induced either by repeated stress
or repeated drug exposure (Deroche et al. 1995; Piazza et al.
1996; Piazza and Le Moal 1996; Ambroggi et al. 2009). In
particular, vulnerable rats had a higher stress-induced increase
in dopaminergic transmission in the nucleus accumbens
(Rougé-Pont et al. 1993). Later, we showed that over an
intermediate period of drug intake, including at least the first
stages of the intensified-use phase, the incentive and
reinforcing properties of drugs were increased or “sensitized,”
not decreased or “undergoing tolerance” (Deroche et al. 1999).
These and related data were used as the basis to the sensi-
tization theory of drug addiction that proposed sensitization of
the motivational systems—which makes the individual in-
creasingly want drugs—as a comprehensive explanation of
addiction (Robinson and Berridge 1993, 2001). Available data
certainly show that sensitization of dopaminergic transmission
is an important element in transition to addiction. However,
these data more particularly point to an important role for
sensitized dopamine in triggering the ISuE use phase, induc-
ing an escalation in drug intake. Later on, an increase in
dopamine seems to play a less important role (Ahmed et al.
2003), and other factors contribute to maintaining the ISuE
phase and to the final transition to the LoC phase and true
addiction. Thus, dopamine sensitization is not an exhaustive
explanation of transition to addiction but probably a crucial
factor specific for the first step of this process.
Clearly, a sensitized dopamine response is not the only
possible mechanism mediating escalated intensified drug
use, but it serves as an example to show that the different
phases of transition to addiction have distinct biological bases.
For example, another well documented mechanism that we
believe could play an important role in the ISuE phase is an
impairment of the prefrontal cortex, and we refer readers to
several good reviews on the subject (Jentsch and Taylor 1999;
Kalivas et al. 2005; Volkow et al. 2011).
How the accumbens dopaminergic system get sensitized
Several independent variables can increase activity
(sensitize) of the dopaminergic projections to the nucleus
accumbens. We describe here variables that have been
identified as relevant and can consequently be advocated
as part of the pathophysiological mechanism leading to
transition to addiction.
One mechanism of transition to intensified drug use that
has been rather extensively studied as a pathophysiological
mechanism is the interaction between glucocorticoid hor-
mones and the dopaminergic system [for review see Piazza
et al. (1996); Piazza and Le Moal (1996, 1997); Marinelli and
Piazza (2002)]. In a series of publications, we showed that
glucocorticoid tone is one of the most crucial regulators of
dopaminergic transmission activity in the accumbens and that
these hormones are involved in the pathophysiological
mechanisms that induce transition from recreational drug
use to escalated sustained drug use (Deroche et al. 1997).
Thus, HR rats have a higher production of glucocorticoids
(Piazza et al. 1991a), and these hormones were a crucial
factor in determining their vulnerability to drug abuse
(Rougé-Pont et al. 1998; Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2003).
Glucocorticoid hormones increase the activity of the do-
paminergic system by acting on one of the two brain
receptors, more specifically, the glucocorticoid receptor
(GR) expressed by striatal medium spiny neurons that
project back to the ventral tegmental area (VTA).
Suppressing the GR specifically in these neurons dramat-
ically reduced the activity of the dopaminergic projection
to the accumbens and induced a behavioral phenotype
identical to the one of abuse-resistant rats; the LR
(Ambroggi et al. 2009). On the contrary, administering
glucocorticoids repeatedly increases vulnerability to drug
self-administration (Deroche et al. 1992).
The pathophysiological role of glucocorticoids was con-
firmed by another series of studies showing that stress-
induced sensitization of dopaminergic transmission (Rougé-
Pont et al. 1995) and the subsequent vulnerability to escalate
to the ISuE phase is dependent on stress-induced glucocorti-
coid production (Deroche et al. 1995; Marinelli and Piazza
2002). Thus, it was enough to block glucocorticoid secretion
to completely suppress the effects of stress on vulnerability to
drug self-administration. Similarly, suppressing the GR in
accumbens medium spiny neurons suppressed the sensitiza-
tion induced by repeated exposure to drugs of abuse
(Ambroggi et al. 2009).
In conclusion, an increase in GR activation seems a suffi-
cient and necessary condition to the expression of increased
vulnerability to drug abuse shown by certain individuals. It is
probably because of this GR overactivation that some indi-
viduals increasingly want more of a drug and have a higher
vulnerability to develop the ISuE phase.
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Impulse and desire: two servants of one master
Desire or impulse? Do we escalate in drug abuse because we
increasingly desire more of a drug or because we cannot
refrain from taking it? This is basically the debate between
supporters of motivational views of addiction (such as the
incentive sensitization theory) and those who favor the role
of impulse control and behavioral disinhibition (Jentsch and
Taylor 1999; Volkow et al. 2011). We believe that available
evidence suggests that both phenomena contribute to the shift
from recreational to sustained drug use. At the behavioral
level, rats vulnerable to escalated sustained drug use show
signs of increased motivation to take drugs and a degree of
impulsivity, in particular, intolerance for delayed reward
(Anker et al. 2009; Marusich and Bardo 2009). Similarly, in
human addicts, motivation to seek a drug is certainly increased
and a higher incidence of impulsivity was found [for review
see (de Wit 2009)]. At the neurobiological level, the increased
activity of dopaminergic neurons in the nucleus accumbens is
consistent with a higher “desire” to take drugs, whereas im-
pairment of the prefrontal cortex was found in human addicts
(Goldstein and Volkow 2011) with a higher impulsivity
(Jentsch and Taylor 1999).
In conclusion, concerning the second phase of transition to
addiction, pathological motivation and increased impulsivity
seem to be two servants of the same master, i.e., transition
from sporadic recreational drug use to ISuE drug use. What
remain unclear is the relationship between impulsivity and
vulnerability to full addiction. We and others found impulsiv-
ity to be associated with sustained escalated drug use but not
with the propensity to lose control and become fully addicted
(Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004). In contrast, Belin et al.
(2008) found that a certain measure of impulsivity predict-
ed LoC. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that
different components of impulsivity may be associated
with different phases of transition to addiction.
Impulsivity is a complex trait composed of multiple com-
ponents, including behavioral disinhibition, intolerance for
delayed reward, and impaired ability to consider the con-
sequences of behaviors (Evenden 1999). Vulnerability to
develop sustained drug use seems reliably associated with
intolerance to delayed reward (Perry et al. 2005, 2008;
Belin et al. 2008; Anker et al. 2009), which differs in
HRs and LRs. In contrast, behavioral disinhibition seems
to predict the development of LoC (Belin et al. 2008;
Winstanley et al. 2010). This result seems quite difficult
to reconcile with the finding that extinction (also a mea-
sure of behavioral disinhibition) and addiction-like behav-
iors are not correlated and load on orthogonal factors
(Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004). It is then possible that
behavioral disinhibition predicts loss of control but does
not mediate it, because it is no longer present when
addiction-like behavior appears.
Allostasis: a pathophysiological mechanism that stabilizes
sustained drug use
The establishment of an allostatic state has been proposed by
LeMoal and Koob as the crucial phenomenon in the addiction
process (Koob and Le Moal 1997, 2001, 2005). In this con-
text, the idea that the word allostasis carries is that following
extended drug use, reward systems adapt to the daily overex-
posure of the brain to drugs by shifting the homeostatic set
point (allostasis) to adapt to this continuous overstimulation.
Because of this shift, the drug state progressively becomes the
normal state and the nondrug state is now perceived as a
pathological, or at least, as an unpleasant state. In other words,
drugs progressively shift from being strongly wanted to also
strongly needed.
The major empirical evidence for this theoretical construct
is modification of the hedonic set point observed in rats that
develop drug abuse. In such rats, the reward system seems to
become less sensitive and needs stronger stimulation to
achieve the same level of reward, as assessed in the electrical
brain-stimulation reward procedure (Ahmed et al. 2002). The
fact that this modification is very short lasting after discontin-
uation of drug self-administration reinforces our idea that this
process plays a major role specifically in stabilizing an ongo-
ing state of sustained drug use.
What makes these data relevant in our opinion is that a
valid experimental medicine approach was used to obtain
them, i.e., comparison of short- and long-access animals,
which differ in the development of signs of sustained drug
use. Although this approach does not take into account indi-
vidual differences but maximizes the influence of drug avail-
ability, it remains a valid experimental medicine approach.
Koob and Le Moal, even before their close collaboration,
were pioneers in seeing addiction for what it is: a pathological
condition that should be explained by a pathophysiological
process and not the use of a “normal” behavioral response to a
nonnatural reward.
In addition to a shift in the hedonic set point, other neuro-
biological and molecular long-term adaptations to chronic
drug intake (see for example Nestler 2005; Kalivas 2009;
Self and Nestler 1995; Wolf 2010a), are potentially involved
in the allostatic state. The only incertitude in this impressive
body of work is to clarify which of the described drug-induced
neuroadaptations are relevant variables for transition to
addiction.
In conclusion, as we said earlier for other available theories
of addiction, we do not think that the published evidence
indicates that allostasis and a shift in the hedonic set point
can explain the entire process of transition to addiction and, in
particular, loss of control of drug intake. However, drug-
induced psychological and physiological allostatic changes
clearly play an important role in maintaining a pathological
and sustained drug use.
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Habitual behavior
Habitual behavior is an experimental psychology concept that
describes how after long periods of training in operant tasks
(e.g., pressing a lever for obtaining food) performed in perfect-
ly standardized conditions, the behavior becomes automated in
the sense that it is no longer initiated with reference to the goal.
Two views of habit learning exist: behaviorist and ideomotor.
According to the ideomotor view, although the behavior is
automated (i.e., triggered by environmental cues), its remains
controlled by its consequences (the value of the reinforcer). In
contrast, according to the behaviorist view, the behavior is
decreasingly controlled by its consequences (the delivery of
the primary reinforcer) and increasingly by environmental
contingencies (i.e., the light associated with drug delivery, the
position of the lever in the chamber, the physical feature of the
chamber, etc.). Because of this, when delivery of the primary
reinforcer (food or drug) is interrupted or the primary reinforc-
er is devalued (by adulteration or punishment), individuals
with a habit will keep responding, whereas changes in lever
position or physical features of the operant chamber will more
effectively disrupt the behavior. In the case of addiction, this
implies that the drug becomes increasingly less necessary to
sustain and control behavior, which becomes more strictly
controlled by the conditions and context in which the drug is
taken (drug paraphernalia, administration context, etc).
The potential role of associative learning and habitual
behavior in addiction is well summarized in recent reviews
by Hogarth et al. (2013). Importantly, the role of habit in
addiction has been progressively revised (Everitt and
Robbins 2005; Belin et al. 2009b, 2013). Indeed, it now seems
unlikely that habit by itself can be responsible for loss of
control of drug use (Robinson and Berridge 2003; Everitt
and Robbins 2005). More recently, in its behaviorist concep-
tion, a role for habit even in earlier phases of transition to
addiction has also been questioned (Hogarth et al. 2010).
Drawing the parallel between the behaviorist habit and full
addiction was certainly tempting because both imply a form of
loss of control. However, controllers and the controlled show
opposite relationships between behaviorist habit and full ad-
diction. In addiction, the individual loses control over the
primary reinforcer, the drug. In habit, the reinforcer loses
control over the behavior of the individual. In other words,
during addiction, the drug gains increasing control over be-
havior, whereas during habit formation, the reinforcer/reward,
i.e. the drug, progressively loses that control. The limited
usefulness of placebo as a treatment for addiction is exemplary
in this context. If drug addiction was a habit, by substituting
the drug with a placebo, the addict should scarcely notice it for
a reasonable amount of time. However, this is not the case, and
even compounds that target the same receptor as the original
abused drug but with different pharmacokinetics—as, for
example, methadone—are not completely satisfactory in
treating addiction. In addition, experimental data in human
(Sheeran et al. 2005; Hogarth et al. 2010) and laboratory
animals (Olmstead et al. 2001; Root et al. 2009) show that
drug-seeking does not become independent of its conse-
quences, as postulated by the behaviorist habit theory.
The first phase of the addiction process—recreational drug
use—cannot be explained by a habit, as the behavior is spo-
radic and controlled by the appetitive effect of the drug (the
primary reinforcer). Escalation to sustained drug use is also
unlikely to be explained by the formation of habit. In this
intermediate phase of addiction, the drug still plays an impor-
tant role; the higher the impact of the primary reinforcer, the
higher the chances of escalation to sustained drug use. When
sustained drug intake is in place, a pathological habit can
contribute to its stabilization. However, this can happen only
in the very specific conditions of standardized and habitual
patterns of drug consumption necessary for habit develop-
ment. In the context of the ideomotor view of automated
behavior (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000; Aarts et al. 2008),
habit could contribute to the impulsive-like drug-seeking ob-
served during sustained drug intake (Sheeran et al. 2005;
Hogarth et al. 2010). Behaviorist habit could also play a role
in stabilizing sustained drug intake. Thus, once sustained drug
use is in place, the development of an allostatic state and the
shift of the hedonic set point appear. Now the individual takes
drugs not to feel high but to feel right. This implies a deval-
uation of the reinforcing effects of the drug despite intense
use, which is consistent with habit behavior but also with an
increased motivational drive created by the appearance of a
discomfort when the drug is absent. In any case, habit behav-
ior can influence intensified drug intake only if the pattern of
drug use is standardized enough to allow for its develop-
ment—a condition that is probably very infrequent in real-
life addiction.
Conclusions: desire, impulse, and need—the three keys
to transition to sustained drug use
In conclusion, development of sustained drug use (the ISuE
phase) can be mediated by sensitized dopaminergic transmis-
sion in the accumbens (as described here) and by decreased
functionality of the prefrontal cortex (Jentsch and Taylor
1999; Goldstein and Volkow 2011). These changes can be
either spontaneously present or induced by stress and drug
exposure. Sensitized dopamine transmission and impaired
prefrontal cortex converge to make drugs highly appetitive
and difficult to resist. In other words, these processes increase
the desire and impulse for the drug and facilitate the develop-
ment of an escalation in drug intake and sustained drug use.
The establishment of sustained drug intake will then induce,
as a form of additional adaptation, an allostatic state associated
with a downregulated reward system that will progressively
bring the nondrug state out of the comfort zone. The drug now
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is not only the object of strong impulses and desire but is also
strongly needed–the transition to an escalated, sustained drug
use is now complete. Finally, under certain conditions of
highly standardized pattern of drug use, the establishment of
habit behavior can also contribute to the maintenance of
sustained drug intake.
Psychobiology of loss of control and full addiction
Impaired synaptic plasticity is associated
with the development of loss of control and full addiction
Our knowledge concerning the pathophysiological mecha-
nisms of the loss of control-prone phenotype is very limited.
Indeed, the only biological modification yet specifically asso-
ciated with loss of control of drug intake is a loss of synaptic
plasticity (Kasanetz et al. 2010, 2012). It is important to
emphasize here that the implication of synaptic plasticity to
addiction was not proposed by us but by several of our
colleagues who showed that, depending on the protocol and
the conditions used, repeated drug intake would induce
impaired synaptic plasticity (White and Kalivas 1998;
Kalivas 2005; Kauer and Malenka 2007; Thomas et al.
2008; Russo et al. 2010; Lüscher and Malenka 2011). Our
contribution was to show that impairment in long-term de-
pression of synaptic transmission (LTD) in the brain is not just
another drug-induced change but to date the only one specif-
ically associated with cocaine-addiction-like behavior.
Briefly, we have shown that after a short period of self-
administration (around 7 days), there are no impairments in
synaptic plasticity (in the form of LTD) in the cortex or the
nucleus accumbens. However, after 18 days, before the ap-
pearance of addiction-like behavior, a loss of N-mathyl-D-
aspartate (NMDA)-dependent LTD appears in the accumbens
of all individuals self-administering cocaine. On the contrary,
no modifications of synaptic plasticity are observed in the
prefrontal cortex. Later on, after 60 days of self-
administration, a normal NMDA-dependent LTD is recovered
in the accumbens of rats that maintain a controlled drug
intake. In contrast, in rats that have developed addiction-like
behavior, LTD in the accumbens appears to be permanently
lost (at least up to 3 months). This stable impairment in
accumbens LTD is accompanied by the appearance of an
impaired metabotropic glutamate receptor 2/3-mediated LTD
(mGluR2/3-LTD) that is observed selectively in the cortex of
addicted rats.
In conclusion, rats that develop addiction-like behaviors
have impaired NMDA and mGluR2/3-dependent LTD in the
nucleus accumbens and prefrontal cortex, respectively, where-
as both types of LTD are functional in nonaddicted rats. An
exception is the endocannabinoid-mediated long-term synap-
tic depression (eCB-LTD) that after 60 days of self-
administration is impaired both in addicted and nonaddicted
rats. Thus, eCB-LTD is an example of drug-induced
neuroadaptations that are unrelated to addiction that we pre-
viously discussed.
These data change the frame of reference in which vulner-
ability and resistance to addiction should be conceptualized.
One way to view resistance and vulnerability to addiction is to
say that some vulnerable individuals have a pathological re-
sponse to addictive drugs, whereas resistant individuals are
insensitive to the addiction-promoting effects of drugs of
abuse. Our data show that this is not the case. Most drug-
induced impairments in synaptic plasticity are initially ob-
served in all individuals, but the majority of individuals, the
resistant ones, are able to adapt and recover frommost of them.
Thus, resistance to drugs is not a passive immunity or insensi-
tivity to the deleterious effects of drugs; this resistance is an
active, biological, adaptive process—an active resilience.
Conversely, the addict does not develop a response to drugs
that is completely different from that of resistant individuals but
is principally an individual who cannot adapt to the changes in
the brain induced by the drug. As a consequence, vulnerability
to addiction can be conceptualized as involving a degree of
“anaplasticity,” the inability to recover a lost function, rather
than a unique sensitivity to the drug’s deleterious effects.
Behavioral crystallization: a “missing” hypothesis
of the psychological process underlying loss of control
and full addiction
We propose here an evidence-based hypothesis of the psycho-
logical process underlying loss of control and full addiction.
This hypothesis is based on the first and only neurobiological
impairment specifically associated with loss of control in a rat
model: i.e., a persistent loss of synaptic plasticity in the nucleus
accumbens and medial prefontal cortex. We propose to the
reader to follow two subsequent steps: (1) conceptualize what
behavioral deficit could follow a loss in synaptic plasticity; (2)
assess whether such a behavioral deficit could be consistent
with the behavior observed in individuals showing the severe
form of SUD characterized by loss of control of drug intake.
It is largely believed, and we agree with this hypothesis,
that synaptic plasticity, as studied by long-term potentiation
(LTP) and LTD, represents the ability of the brain to strength-
en or depress neuronal circuits in order to maintain adaptive
behavioral responses to changes in environmental contingen-
cies (Goto et al. 2010; Neiman and Loewenstein 2013). In
other words, one can say that the synapses of the brain circuit
mediating a current behavioral sequence are “fully potentiat-
ed.” However, if an environmental event makes a current
behavioral sequence maladaptive, your brain is able to depress
the synaptic strength in that circuit and potentiate synaptic
strength in a new circuit, thus mediating a new and more
adaptive behavioral sequence. In other words, the balance
between potentiation (LTP) and depression (LTD) can shift
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from one behavior to another and maintain a flexible and
adaptive behavior.
Let us imagine that, as observed in rats showing addiction-
like behaviors, the brain loses the ability to perform LTD,
especially in regions such as the nucleus accumbens and
prefrontal cortex, which are important in selecting appropriate
goal-directed behaviors. The consequences would be quite
catastrophic: behavior would remain crystallized around one
behavioral goal and would not be able to shift to another.
There would be great perseverance to achieve the crystallized
goal no matter the costs or consequences. This would be
externally manifested as a considerable loss of control of drug
use that will become very difficult to change. However, this is
not a state of compulsive pathological motivation for the drug
but a “prison” from which the behavior, crystallized around
one unique goal, taking drugs, is not very likely to escape.
There is a metaphoric example that we like to provide to
students to explain the concept of behavioral crystallization.
Imagine that the brain is a tank full of water and behavioral
goals are cylinders of very different shapes. You behave in a
certain way when one of the behavioral cylinders is immersed
in the water tank. When the brain functions normally, you can
easily remove a given cylinder, submerge a different one, and
change behavior. However, if the water freezes, i.e., crystallizes
(loss of synaptic plasticity), it will hold tight to the cylinder that
was submerged at the time (taking drugs), and you will then be
stuck in the prison of this behavioral goal. With some help,
effort, and scraping (painful first period of any detoxification
therapy), you will be able to extract the active cylinder from the
crystallized water. However, it will be impossible to fill the
remaining hole with any other behavioral cylinder. Your be-
havior is now crystallized, you can learn to live with this hole
but it will be too strong a temptation, given the occasion, to fill
it up again with the only cylinder that fits: taking drugs (quick
relapse to drug addiction even after prolonged abstinence).
Clearly, the water could melt again and the behavior regain
plasticity. However, this seems to happen in a very restricted
number of individuals; rather, addiction becomes a “frozen”
chronic relapsing disease in 90 % of cases.
In conclusion, because of behavioral crystallization, drugs
are not only wanted and needed but also irremediably missed
when they are not present. The absence of drugs is felt as the
irreplaceable loss of something very dear and precious, like a
pathological mourning that cannot be overcome. When we
start pathologically mourning the “missing” drug and can no
longer escape from its embrace, there and then the transition to
addiction is complete.
Changing places: from the VTA to the accumbens
to the cortex—a likely road to full addiction
One interesting hypothesis put forward recently is that during
transition to addiction, modifications in synaptic plasticity
migrate following a ventrodorsal gradient (Lüscher and
Malenka 2011). Changes in plasticity would occur quickly
in the VTA, migrate then to the accumbens, and later on to the
prefrontal cortex. This process of the transfer of learned
information between structures of the brain is a well-
known concept that has been described for motor learning
(Salmon and Butters 1995; Karni et al. 1995; Jueptner
et al. 1997; Wu et al. 2008) and for spatial or declarative
memory processes in both rodents and humans (Bontempi
et al. 1999; Frankland and Bontempi 2005; Winocur et al.
2010; Helie et al. 2010).
Regarding memory formation, it is recognized that spatial
information about a given environment is acquired through
the hippocampus and then moves to the cortex for long-term
storage (Winocur et al. 2010). Rule-based categorization in
humans appears to move from subcortical to cortical regions
automatically (Helie et al. 2010). The classic view of motor
learning postulates that novel behaviors are dependent on the
cortex, whereas automatic behaviors are primarily mediated
by subcortical structures, e.g., the striatum. Although this
view is now questioned (Ashby et al. 2010) and the role of
the striatum in automatic motor tasks (such as playing a well-
learned musical piece) and habitual behavior has been chal-
lenged, it remains true that plasticity phenomenawithin (Karni
et al. 1995) and between brain structures occur (Wu et al.
2008) when automatic behaviors develop.
In the case of addiction, evidence suggest that the
regions controlling drug use progress from the VTA to
the accumbens and finally to the cortex. Thus, the
accumbens seems completely spared during the first
week of self-administration, during which the VTA
should be affected. Modifications in the accumbens
appear only later on but before the appearance of
addiction-like behaviors. The last region to show a
change in synaptic plasticity (which appears only in
addicted rats) is the prefrontal cortex (Kasanetz et al.
2010, 2012).
It has also been suggested, based on neurochemical and
pharmacological evidence (Veeneman et al. 2012; Willuhn
et al. 2012), that the response to drugs of abuse and cues
associated with them moves from the nucleus accumbens to
the dorsal striatum (Belin and Everitt 2008; Belin-Rauscent
et al. 2012). In the original framework that describes addiction
as a form of habit-like behavior (Tiffany 1990), this shift is
seen as the fundamental trigger of a stimulus–response habit
(Belin et al. 2013).
In conclusion, whatever the exact structures involved and
the exact timing of progression, the observations summarized
above indicate that depending on the phase of transition to
addiction, different structures mediate responses to drugs.
These data strongly support the idea posited by our theory
that the process of addiction is mediated by independent but
concatenated phases.
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Why this is a general theory
The reader will notice that we call this not just a theory but a
general theory—the first of its kind in the field of addiction
research. What is the difference? Theories are usually stand-
alone explanations of a phenomenon; they are backed by a
series of arguments and by careful refutation of other pre-
existing theories. In contrast, general theories attempt to pro-
vide a framework that explains and integrates all existing
relevant knowledge and previous existing theories.
We believe that ours is a general theory of transition to
addiction because it consolidates the knowledge generated by
the drug-addiction research field over 40 years of research.
Different competing explanations now appear as important
pieces of a complex process that is not one or the other but all
of them. The only processes that are discarded or not discussed
here are those for which the relevance to addiction remain to be
proven. The framework inwhich to solve this incertitude (going
from independent to relevant variables) is also provided here.
Major fundamental concepts and predictions of the general
theory
When positing a theory, it is important to define its exact
postulates and predictions and what should be demonstrated
to invalidate it. For this reason, the three following paragraphs
describe the fundamental concepts of our theory and which
deviation from them would or would not invalidate it.
Transition to addiction depends on an interaction
between individual vulnerabilities and drug exposure
This statement is supported by the observations that transition
to addiction is the result of sequential interactions between: (1)
degree of vulnerability of an individual, because addiction
appears only in a few individuals, even when all individuals
were exposed to similar quantities of drugs; (2) degree of
exposure to drugs, because addiction—even in the few indi-
viduals—appears only after extended access to drugs.
Variation in the degree of these interactions cannot be seen
as a fundamental fallacy of our theory. On the other hand, if it
is demonstrated that one of these two variables is not neces-
sary in the development of pathological drug use in conditions
that can be approximated to the ones occuring in human
societies, then our theory will be falsified.
Transition to addiction is a process that develops
along at least three steps
This statement is supported by the observations that different
types of individual vulnerabilities and different psychobiological
processes are involved in the three behavioral phases of the
process of transition to addiction. The division into three steps
proposed here and the underlying biological basis seem most
appropriate on the basis of current knowledge. Consequently,
new evidence could increase the number of steps and add to or
revise the psychobiological substrates. This should not to be
seen as a major revision of the theory. On the other hand, if it is
demonstrated that transition to addiction develops in less than
three steps, then our theory will be falsified.
Transition to addiction is a true psychiatric disease
This statement is based on the observation that transition to
addiction is a multistep pathological process that, similarly to
other psychiatric diseases, depends on the interaction between
a vulnerable individual and a stimulus—drugs of abuse—
which is not pathogenic in the general population.
The discovery of new types of vulnerabilities, of new com-
pounds susceptible to inducing transition to addiction, or revision
of the percentage of individuals shifting from drug use to addic-
tion, cannot be seen as invalidating of our theory. On the other
hand, the demonstration that in most conditions drug exposure is
both necessary and sufficient to induce addiction, will invalidate
or falsify our theory.
Farewell
Pleasure, desire, need, and mourning: could these four words
summarize addiction, one of themost serious psychiatric diseases
of our society? Could it be so simple? The evidence accumulated
by the addiction research field over the last 40 years suggests that
this is likely the case. Probably tomorrow, this simple sequence
of four internal states will be laughed at or more likely forgotten.
This is the fate of all evidence-based theories and a fate that we
gladly accept. We prefer the shaky ground of evidence to the
more solid one of theoretical preconceptions. Science is certainly
much better served by an evolving “what it is” than from a
durable “what it should be.” Crystallization, even of ideas, is
not good.
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